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Changes in the size distribution of income during the 1980s have 
resulted in a proliferation of new research on the distribution of income 
and earnings (for a review of the work through the 1980s, see Levy and 
Murnane 1992). Most of the recent work has focused on explaining 
increased earnings inequality in the United States during the 1980s, 
although Raj and Slottje (1994) found that the trend of increasing ine 
quality extends back further.
Far less is known about the size distribution once employer-pro 
vided nonwage benefits are taken into account. It is well-known, how 
ever, that employee benefits are a significant part of total compen 
sation—voluntarily provided employee benefits such as pensions, 
health insurance, and life insurance accounted for 9.2 percent of all 
employer expenditures for employee compensation in 1994, and 
legally required employee benefits such as Social Security, unemploy 
ment insurance, and workers' compensation accounted for another 7.4 
percent of compensation expenditures (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1998). Two issues need to be explored: 1) whether the picture of 
income inequality would change if employee benefits were taken into 
account and 2) whether changes in the mix of total compensation have 
occurred concurrently with changes in income inequality, hence alter 
ing the picture of changes in inequality over time.
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The basic difficulty faced by researchers who would like to include 
employee benefits in estimates of income distribution is that few exist 
ing household surveys record the employer contribution in dollar terms 
for major voluntarily provided benefits, such as health insurance and 
pensions. It is now relatively common for household surveys to record 
whether a worker is covered by an employer-provided health insurance 
or pension plan—for example, the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
National Longitudinal Surveys, and Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
all include questions on health insurance and pension plan coverage at 
least periodically. Coverage data are little help, however, in gaining an 
understanding of how employer provision of benefits (or changes over 
time in that provision) might bear on the size distribution of income (or 
changes over time in that distribution).
The lack of household data on employer contributions for fringe 
benefits explains the scarcity of research on how benefits bear on the 
size distribution of income. In what is, to our knowledge, the first 
attempt to examine the issue, Tim Smeeding (1983) linked establish 
ment data on benefit contributions from the Survey of Employer 
Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEEC) to household data 
from the CPS, thereby imputing the dollar benefit contributions made 
in behalf of individual workers. Lack of data directly linking a worker 
to employer contributions in that worker's name necessitated such an 
imputation procedure, although it is clearly a less than ideal way of 
understanding how benefits bear on income distribution.
In this chapter, we attempt to improve on Smeeding's work in three 
ways. First, we make use of two household surveys that provide data 
on concurrent health insurance contributions, accumulated pension 
contributions made by an employer in a worker's name, or the pension 
benefits that a worker can expect to receive from participation in the 
pension plan of a current or past employer. The direct link between a 
worker and his or her employee benefits is clearly a desirable improve 
ment. Second, we examine inequality in both the joint distribution of 
total compensation and the marginal distributions of the income com 
ponents. In particular, we present a decomposition of the Gini inequal 
ity coefficient that gives a rough idea of the contribution of each 
component of compensation to overall inequality. Third, by using 
more recent data, we are able to draw inferences on whether and how
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the role of benefits in contributing to income inequality changed over 
the decade of the 1980s.
Others have attempted improvements on Smeeding's work as well, 
although most have focused exclusively on the effect of pensions on 
the distribution of income and wealth. For example, Benedict and 
Shaw (1995) used the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to 
examine how annual pension accruals (calculated as the annual 
increase in the present value of pension wealth) affect the distribution 
of earnings. They found that pensions increased annual income ine 
quality slightly in 1983. (Our work using the 1983 and 1989 SCF, 
reported below, differs from that of Shaw and Benedict by focusing on 
pension wealth—and changes in pension wealth—between 1983 and 
1989.) Several others, including Weicher (1997), Wolff (1994), and 
Kennickell and Sunden (1997), have done work yielding results that 
can be compared with those in our fourth section, and we draw those 
comparisons below.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we briefly 
describe the measures we use to make inferences about inequality. In 
particular, we develop the decomposition of the well-known Gini coef 
ficient. We show that inequality can be decomposed by component of 
compensation into inequality within each component of compensation 
and inequality across components. We use the Gini coefficient to make 
these decompositions meaningful within and across components of 
compensation.
The second section presents results on the distribution of compen 
sation using current contributions to health insurance and pensions 
from an old establishment data set—the 1977 EEEC survey. Oddly 
enough, the EEEC remains the most recent establishment-level data 
available. (The establishment-level data underlying the Employment 
Cost Index have never been made available to researchers.) Although 
dated, the 1977 EEEC do provide a useful benchmark because they are 
the data on which Smeeding's inferences were based.
The third section examines the distribution of personal income and 
employer contributions to health insurance plans using the 1977 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) and the 1987 
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). These two surveys 
were fielded to improve understanding of a broad array of health care 
issues, but they can also be used to obtain estimates of the extent to
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which employer contributions to health insurance plans increase or 
decrease the distribution of compensation.
In the fourth section, we develop estimates of wealth inequality 
using the 1983 and 1989 SCF. Much previous work on wealth inequal 
ity has been based on the SCF (see, for example, Kennickell and 
Sunden 1997; Weicher 1995, 1997; Wolff 1987, 1994, 1996), and we 
attempt to expand on this work by adding private pension wealth and 
Social Security wealth to the measurement of wealth inequality. We 
argue that, for two reasons, wealth holdings provide the proper context 
in which to examine the influence of employer-provided pensions on 
inequality in the distribution of compensation. First, annual pension 
contributions in behalf of an individual worker are frequently unob- 
servable (as with defined-benefit plans). Second, when annual contri 
butions are observable (as with defined-contribution plans), they may 
vary from year to year in ways that have little to do with the ultimate 
generosity of the retirement income to be derived from a pension plan. 
(The argument for using pension wealth and Social Security wealth in 
gauging the extent to which pensions contribute to inequality is similar 
to the argument for using Social Security wealth and pension wealth in 
analyzing retirement incentives; see, for example, Burkhauser and 
Quinn 1983; Quinn and Burkhauser 1983.)
One disclaimer needs to be made at the outset. We have not 
attempted to adjust the dollar contributions to health insurance or pen 
sion plans to reflect the "value" to the worker of those contributions. 
Since there are both tax advantages and scale advantages to receiving 
health insurance and pensions from an employer, dollar contributions 
by an employer may understate the value to workers of employer-pro 
vided nonwage benefits (see, for example, Smeeding 1983, pp. 243- 
245; Famulari and Manser 1989). We defer an examination of these 
valuation issues for the time being.
INEQUALITY MEASURES AND A DECOMPOSITION OF 
THE GINI COEFFICIENT
In this chapter, we use three measures of inequality: 1) the percent 
age of compensation (or a component of compensation) received by
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the top 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of the size distribution, 2) 
the coefficient of variation, and 3) the Gini coefficient, including a 
decomposition of the Gini. Although other measures of inequality 
could be used, all three of these measures (except for the Gini decom 
position to be developed next) are well understood and should provide 
useful estimates of the extent of inequality of total compensation and 
its components. (For an accessible discussion of a variety of other ine 
quality measures, see Cowell 1977.)
As already mentioned, a decomposition of the Gini coefficient is 
useful in showing how changes in the distribution of employee benefits 
have influenced the distribution of total compensation. Yitzhaki (1983) 
has shown that the Gini coefficient can be written as:
G(JC) = 2 cov[jt, F(*)] / n* (1)
where F(x) is the cumulative distribution of x, and \LX is the mean of jc. 
Note that this formulation is similar to the coefficient of variation: writ 
ing the variance as cov(jc, jc), the coefficient of variation is cov(;t, x) m -r
M*-
Suppose now that total compensation (x) is composed of wage and
salary earnings (w) and employee benefits (b}\
x = w + b (2)
Since cov(w + b, z) = cov(w, z) + cov(b, z), where z is a random vari 
able, the Gini coefficient can be decomposed as follows:
G(JC) = 2 cov[w, F(*)] / M* + 2 cov[fc, F(jt)] / \JLX (3) 
Now multiply the first term by the following well-chosen 1,
cov[w, F(w)](lvv / cov[w, F(w)]\iw (4)
where |ix is the mean of w, and multiply the second term by a similar 
well-chosen 1,
, F(b)] M* (5)
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where [ib is the mean of b, and rearrange terms to obtain
cov[w, F(x)] 2 cov[w, F(w)] \iw (6)Lf(X) = ——————————• ———————————— •—— v '
cov[w,
| c
cov[b, F(b)] \\, b (I x
The first part of the first term {cov[w, F(x)] I cov[w, F(w)]} is the 
Gini correlation coefficient of w (wage and salary earnings) with x 
(total compensation), which we denote R^ This correlation has a mix 
ture of properties of the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coeffi 
cients. Specifically, it is Pearson in w and Spearman in x. The second 
part of the first term (2 cov[w, F(w)] I \\,w ] is the Gini coefficient of w, 
which we denote Gw. The third part of the first term (\\,w I \JLX) is the 
share of wage and salary earnings in total compensation, which we 
denote S^ Defining Rb as the Gini correlation coefficient of employee 
benefits (b) with total compensation, Gb as the Gini coefficient of 
employee benefits, and Sb as the share of employee benefits in total 
compensation, we can rewrite Eq. 6 as follows:
That is, the contribution of each component of compensation to the 
inequality of total compensation equals the Gini correlation between 
that component and total compensation (/?,), multiplied by that compo 
nent's Gini coefficient (G(), multiplied by that component's share of 
total compensation (5,).
FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF EMPLOYER 
EXPENDITURES FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION (EEEC)
The EEEC was a survey of establishments conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1966 through 1977. The 1977 EEEC 
sampled 3,320 establishments of all sizes in order to obtain detailed 
data on wages and employer contributions to employee benefit plans.
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From our standpoint, the main advantage of the EEEC is that it 
includes data on dollar expenditures by the employer on health insur 
ance and pension plans, as opposed to just employee benefit coverage. 
Hence, it allows one to examine inequality in the distribution of three 
components of compensation: wages and salaries (or payroll), 
employer contributions to health insurance (a category that includes 
life insurance in the EEEC), and employer contributions to pensions.
We derive inequality estimates from a sample of 5,714 groups of 
workers from the 1977 EEEC. It is important to understand that, 
although the EEEC are establishment-level data, we actually observe 
workers disaggregated into two groups in each establishment: blue-col 
lar workers and white-collar workers. Hence, the unit of observation is 
not the establishment per se, but either a group of blue-collar workers 
or a group of white-collar workers observed in an establishment 
included in the EEEC survey.
Table 1 displays the basic results on the distribution of total com 
pensation from the 1977 EEEC. The average payroll per worker of 
establishments in the survey was just over $12,500, average contribu 
tions to health and life insurance were nearly $550, and average pen 
sion contributions were just over $550. As Table 1 shows, the median 
level of each of the three components is lower than the mean, suggest 
ing positively skewed distributions.
All the measures of inequality—shares of the top 5 percent, 10 per 
cent, and 20 percent, as well as the coefficient of variation and the 
Gini—suggest that payroll earnings are the most equally distributed 
component of compensation and that pension contributions are the 
least equally distributed component. This finding accords with Smeed- 
ing's (1983) basic finding although, as already noted, Smeeding linked 
the EEEC data with individual CPS data.
The evidence suggests that health insurance and pension contribu 
tions are highly correlated with total compensation—the Gini correla 
tion coefficient between health contributions and total compensation is 
0.75, and that between pension contributions and total compensation is 
0.76. The findings suggest, then, that health and pension contributions 
both tend to increase the overall inequality of total compensation: the 
Gini coefficient for payroll is 0.265, whereas the Gini for total com 
pensation is slightly higher, 0.277.
Table 1 Distribution of Total Compensation, 1977
Share of total
Mean ($) _______ % Share of _______ Coefficient Gini Gini compensation 
____________ (std. dev ) Median ($) Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% of variation correlation coefficient ____ (%) 
Total compensation 13,688 n^ lu ^ ^ Qm _
™ n '898 10- 8 19 - 3 34 - 2 °-481 °-995 0265 91.9 (6,040)
Health and life , . . >44- 
insurance 423 177 29.7 48.4 0.899 0.749 0473 4.0
contributions
PenS1°" . ^l, 267 26.5 42.6 64.7 1383 0.760 0657 4.1 contributions (770)
SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of 1977 EEEC data on 5,714 worker groups in 3,320 establishments.
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FINDINGS ON HEALTH INSURANCE FROM THE MEDICAL 
EXPENDITURE SURVEYS
In this section, we examine two surveys that combine data on the 
income of individuals with data on employer contributions to health 
insurance that were made for an individual. The first is the 1977 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES), and the second 
is the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). Our goal 
is to understand the distribution of employer contributions to health 
insurance and the extent to which that distribution adds to or subtracts 
from overall inequality in the distribution of compensation.
Data Sources
The National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) is a 
1977-1978 survey of roughly 14,000 households. It was designed to 
obtain data on the health status, access to health care, and health insur 
ance coverage of a representative sample of the civilian, noninstitu- 
tional U.S. population. The NMCES has two parts. The first part—a 
household survey—contains standard data on demographic character 
istics and personal income, as well as the data on health status and 
access to health care that were the primary reasons for conducting the 
survey (Kasper, Walden, and Wilson 1983). The second part—the 
Health Insurance/Employer Survey (or HIES)—is a supplement to the 
NMCES that is highly unusual in that it includes data obtained from 
employers on premiums paid for the health insurance of each covered 
worker in the sample (Cantor 1986).
The National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) is a 1987 sur 
vey of roughly 14,000 households whose purpose was the same as the 
1977 NMCES (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1991). 
Like the NMCES, the 1987 NMES includes both a household survey 
and a supplement—the Health Insurance Plan Survey (or HIPS)—that 
includes data on the characteristics of the employer-provided health 
insurance (if any) covering each worker in the sample. As with the 
NMCES, these data were collected from employers and include the 
premiums paid by employers for health insurance.
Data on workers' wages and salaries are nonexistent in the 1977 
NMCES sample and limited in the 1987 NMES sample, a drawback
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when using these data sets for the purposes we have in mind. We are 
forced to use personal income from all sources as a proxy for wage and 
salary earnings. The availability of accurate data on employer contri 
butions to health insurance is the overriding reason for using these data 
sets.
To examine how employer-provided health insurance contributed 
to inequality in the distribution of compensation, we select samples of 
workers aged 25 and over who were employed full-year from the 1977 
NMCES and 1987 NMES. We have attempted to create samples that 
are as comparable as possible, but the questions on employment in the 
two surveys differ somewhat. Specifically, the 1977 NMCES includes 
a single variable indicating whether a worker was "continuously 
employed," whereas the 1987 NMES includes a series of questions 
(and variables) in each of four survey rounds on whether the worker 
was employed or unemployed and the number of weeks of employ 
ment. For the 1977 NMCES, we have included workers in the sample 
who are defined as "employed all year." (The definition of this variable 
is rather problematic. It appears to include both workers who were 
employed continuously during 1977 and workers who were employed 
at some time during 1977 but whose employment continuity was 
unknown.) In the 1987 NMES, we have included individuals who 
worked 48 or more weeks during 1987. It is impossible to know pre 
cisely how comparable these two sets of inclusion criteria are, but we 
believe that, given the survey questions, we have created two samples 
that are as comparable as possible. Ultimately, we have used a sample 
of 7,963 workers from the 1977 NMCES and a sample of 6,009 work 
ers from the 1987 NMES. (For the 1977 NMCES, we use the WTINSP 
weight; for the 1987 NMES, we use the INCALPER weight.)
Findings
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and various measures of the 
inequality of employer contributions to health insurance, personal 
income, and total compensation for 1977 (from the NMCES) and 1987 
(from the NMES). As already noted, because the NMCES does not 
include information on wage and salary earnings, we define total com 
pensation here as personal income plus employer contributions to 
health insurance.



























Share of total 
% Share of Coefficient Gmi Gmi compensation
Median ($) Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% of variation correlation coefficient
11,683 19.8 296 44.9 0.938 - 0.403
11,150 20.2 30.1 45.4 0.959 0.999 0.407
243 22.7 37.4 60.4 1.270 0.434 0634
23,000 17.6 27.4 42.9 0.893 - 0.375
21,802 18.1 28.0 43.5 0.921 0998 0.381








SOURCE: Authors' computations from samples of workers aged 25 or older and employed "full-year" in the 1977 National Medical 
Care Expenditures Survey (Af=7,963) and the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey (Af=6,009).
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In 1977, the average personal income of full-year workers aged 25 
and over in the NMCES was about $13,700 (in current dollars), and the 
average employer contribution to health insurance was slightly over 
$400. In 1987, the average personal income of full-year workers aged 
25 and over in the NMES was about $26,300 (in current dollars), and 
the average employer contribution to health insurance was about 
$1,200. Thus, in 1977 employer contributions to health insurance 
made up 2.9 percent of what we are denning as total compensation 
(personal income plus employer contributions to health insurance), 
whereas in 1987 employer contributions to health insurance were 4.4 
percent of total compensation. This roughly 50 percent growth in the 
share of compensation accounted for by health insurance closely mir 
rors the economy-wide growth in the share of total compensation 
accounted for by employer contributions to health insurance observed 
in the National Income and Product Accounts from 1977 to 1987 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1998).
In both 1977 and 1987, the median personal income and the 
median employer contribution to health insurance are well below the 
means for either of these variables in both years, suggesting positively 
skewed distributions.
Figures on the share of personal income and of contributions to 
health insurance going to workers in the top 5 percent, 10 percent, and 
20 percent of the size distribution clearly show that, in both 1977 and 
1987, personal income was more equally distributed than employer 
contributions to health insurance. The coefficients of variation and the 
Gini coefficients for personal income and employer contributions to 
health insurance provide the same inference.
However, total compensation is more equally distributed than 
either personal income or employer contributions to health insurance. 
The Gini coefficients for personal income are 0.407 (in 1977) and 
0.381 (in 1987), and the Ginis for employer contributions to health 
insurance are 0.634 (in 1977) and 0.569 (in 1988). The Ginis for total 
compensation, however, are slightly lower than the Ginis for either 
component—0.403 (in 1977) and 0.375 (in 1987). That is, even 
though employer contributions to health insurance were more 
unequally distributed than personal income in both 1977 and 1987, 
health contributions were distributed so as to slightly lower overall ine 
quality. Similar inferences follow from an examination of the coeffi-
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cients of variation and shares of total compensation going to the top 5, 
10, and 20 percent of individuals. The distribution of health insurance 
contributions reduces the inequality of the distribution of total compen 
sation, even though it is less equally distributed than personal income.
The finding that total compensation is more equally distributed 
than its components suggests both the importance of micro data in 
drawing inferences about compensation inequality and the usefulness 
of the Gini decomposition. Also, it accords with the rather low correla 
tions between total compensation and health contributions—the Gini 
correlation coefficients of health contributions with total compensation 
are just 0.434 (in 1977) and 0.479 (in 1987).
The finding from both the NMCES and the NMES that health con 
tributions are more unequally distributed than personal income accords 
(in a rough way) with the finding from the EEEC establishment data 
that health contributions are more unequally distributed than is payroll. 
But the conclusion from the NMCES and NMES that health contribu 
tions decrease overall inequality is counter to the analogous finding 
from the EEEC establishment data. The result suggests both the 
importance of micro data in drawing inferences about compensation 
inequality and the usefulness of the Gini decomposition.
In contrast to many studies of wage and income inequality in the 
1980s, the NMCES and NMES suggest that the distribution of personal 
income became somewhat more equal between 1977 and 1987. (On 
the distribution of earnings, see Levy and Murnane 1992; on the distri 
bution of personal income, see Raj and Slottje 1994.) Given the pre 
ponderance of evidence that the distribution of earnings and income 
became less equal during the 1980s, we are unwilling to place much 
weight on this interyear comparison. It seems likely that the result is 
due to the difficulty we had in creating comparable samples of workers 
from the NMCES and NMES. In other words, the finding that personal 
income inequality fell between 1977 and 1987 should probably be 
viewed as an artifact of the way we had to draw our samples.
To summarize, employer contributions to health insurance in both 
1977 and 1987 were far less equally distributed than personal income 
among full-year workers aged 25 and older. However, although very 
unequal, the distribution of employer contributions to health insurance 
was such that it slightly lowered the distribution of total compensation
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(defined as the sum of personal income and employer contributions to 
health insurance).
FINDINGS ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WEALTH 
DISTRIBUTION FROM THE SCF
In analyzing the EEEC data, we took the annual employer contri 
bution to the pension plan as an accurate reflection of the pension 
plan's generosity. But the annual contribution may vary from year to 
year depending on changes in the performance of the pension plan's 
assets or in changes in actuarial assumptions. Hence, the annual con 
tribution to a pension plan may be a poor reflection of the plan's gener 
osity, understood as the stream of retirement income that the pension 
plan ultimately will yield. In order to obtain a more accurate picture of 
how pensions contribute to individual inequality, it is necessary to con 
sider the asset value of a pension plan—that is, the present value of the 
promised future income stream to be derived from the pension.
In this section, we use the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) to examine the distribution of retirement and nonretire- 
ment wealth (Kennickell and Shack-Marquez 1992; Fries, 
Starr-McCluer, and Sunden 1998). We construct estimates of both pri 
vate pension wealth and Social Security wealth and compare the distri 
bution of these with the distribution of other more conventional forms 
of wealth, such as housing and business assets. Our premise is that 
wealth holdings provide the proper context in which to examine the 
influence of employer-provided pensions on inequality.
Data Sources and Variable Construction
The 1983 and 1989 SCFs are a natural choice for studies of the dis 
tribution of wealth, and they have been used in previous work on 
wealth inequality (Wolff 1987,1994, 1996, 1998; Weicher 1995, 1997; 
Kennickell and Sunden 1997). The SCF is an extensive survey 
designed to estimate the wealth holdings of a representative sample of 
households in the United States. It includes information on pensions 
and retirement wealth, as well as data on conventional asset holdings
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such as property and financial wealth. In addition, the SCF includes 
retrospective data on the employment histories of both the respondent 
and spouse (if present).
The main strength of the SCF, from our standpoint, is its data on 
asset holdings and coverage by private pension plans. Although asset 
holdings and pension coverage are self-reported, inspection of the 
questionnaire and the asset and pension data themselves suggest that 
considerable lengths were taken to obtain a consistent picture of house 
holds' assets and pension expectations. Also, the SCF's employment 
data are sufficient to construct a reasonable approximation to Social 
Security wealth, as described below.
We draw samples of households from the 1983 and 1989 SCFs that 
mirror those used by Feldstein (1976) in his pioneering study of Social 
Security wealth. That is, we examine all households in which there 
was a male aged 35 to 64 present. This basic selection criterion yields 
samples of 1,721 households in 1983 and 1,572 in 1989.
Three forms of wealth are of main interest to us: 1) private pension 
wealth, 2) Social Security wealth, and 3) nonretirement wealth. The 
first two are the main forms of retirement wealth held by households, 
and the third includes all forms of conventional (or nonretirement) 
wealth. We discuss the construction of variables measuring each in 
turn.
Private Pension Wealth. The present value of expected annual 
pension benefits for which a household is eligible represents that 
household's private pension wealth. Private pension wealth must be 
computed separately for defined-benefit and defined-contribution pen 
sion plans.
For defined-benefit pension plans, we have calculated the present 
value of 1) pension benefits that are expected in the future from current 
employment, 2) pension benefits that are expected in the future from 
past employment, and 3) pension benefits currently being received 
from past employment.
For both men and women expecting to receive a defined-benefit 
pension from a current job or jobs, we use the self-reported age of 
expected pension receipt and the annual pension amount to calculate a 
present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the expected 
age at which benefits begin until age 100. We adjust each year's bene-
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fit amount for the probability of death based on the worker's gender 
and age at which the benefit would be received (National Center for 
Health Statistics 1984). We subtract the present value of employee 
contributions (also adjusted for the probability of death) from the cur 
rent year until the expected retirement age. Benefits and contributions 
are discounted back to the present (1983 or 1989) at a rate of 9 percent 
(the Federal Funds rate in both 1983 and 1989).
For both men and women expecting to receive a defined-benefit 
pension from a past job or jobs, the procedure is similar. We again cal 
culate a present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the 
age when benefits are expected to begin until age 100, adjusting for the 
probability of death in each year. We subtract the present value of 
employee contributions (again adjusted for the probability of death) 
and again use a discount rate of 9 percent.
For both men and women who are currently receiving pensions, we 
calculate a present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the 
current age until age 100, using a 9 percent discount rate and adjusting 
for the probability of death in each year.
For defined-contribution pension plans, we follow Wolff (1987), 
McDermed, Clark, and Alien (1989), and Kennickell and Sunden 
(1997) in using the current amount reported in a worker's defined-con 
tribution account as the measure of pension wealth. The dollar amount 
in any profit-sharing plan held by the individual is also included as 
pension wealth. The 1983 SCF includes information on one 
defined-contribution plan from a current employer for each individual 
(respondent and spouse) and up to three plans (either defined-contribu 
tion or defined-benefit) for each individual from past employers. The 
1989 SCF includes information on up to three defined-contribution 
plans from a current employer for each individual (respondent and 
spouse) and up to six defined-contribution plans for each individual 
from past employers.
To arrive at a summary measure of private pension wealth for each 
household, we sum the pension assets from all sources except for Indi 
vidual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh plans. We treat IRAs 
and Keogh account balances as a separate category of retirement 
wealth, using the current account balances as the measure of wealth in 
each.
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Social Security Wealth. The present discounted value of the Social 
Security old-age benefits for which a household is eligible represents 
the household's Social Security wealth. We compute Social Security 
wealth in a way resembling the method Feldstein (1976) used with the 
1963-1964 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, a survey 
that is similar to the SCF used here.
For a respondent and spouse who are not currently receiving Social 
Security benefits, we impute the expected annual Social Security 
old-age benefit by assigning a Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) based 
on the relative position of the individual's earnings in the earnings dis 
tribution of workers of his or her age and gender. (Five-year age 
cohorts of workers were used to avoid using distributions based on 
very small samples.) Specifically, we use the worker's current earnings 
unless the worker was not currently employed, in which case we use 
the highest earnings from past jobs and bring them forward to the cur 
rent year (either 1983 or 1989) using the wage index factor used by the 
Social Security Administration (Social Security Administration 1984). 
For each respondent and spouse, we obtain the relative position in the 
earnings distribution that the individual occupied in his or her gender 
and five-year age cohort. If this relative position in the earnings distri 
bution did not change over the working life, then the individual would 
be at the same relative position in the benefits distribution at the time of 
retirement. Each worker's Social Security benefit was imputed from 
the distribution of benefits paid for newly retired workers using the rel 
ative position of each worker in the earnings distribution.
Each household's Social Security benefits are then computed from 
individual Social Security benefits. For a single-worker household, we 
sum the worker's benefit amount and the spouse's benefit amount 
(one-half the worker's benefit). For a two-worker household, we take 
the larger of 1) the sum of the benefit amount of the worker with higher 
benefits and the corresponding spouse's benefit amount or 2) the sum 
of the two workers' imputed benefit amounts.
To convert each household's benefit amount into household Social 
Security wealth, we calculate a present value of the flow of future 
Social Security benefits from age 65 until age 100. We adjust each 
year's benefit amount for the probability of death based on the 
worker's gender and age. (Also, we take account of expected widow's 
or widower's benefits by calculating the joint probability that the
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worker will be deceased and the spouse will be alive and by applying 
this probability to the worker's benefit amount*.) We assume that the 
annual benefit amount grows at 4 percent per year from the current 
year onward, and we discount benefits back to the present (1983 or 
1989) at a rate of 9 percent.
For all households currently receiving Social Security old-age or 
disability benefits, we use current benefit amounts to calculate a 
present value of the flow of future Social Security benefits from the 
current age until age 100. We adjust for the probability of death in 
each year, allow benefits to grow at an annual rate of 4 percent, and 
discount to the present at a rate of 9 percent.
Nonretirement Wealth. Most forms of assets and wealth as con 
ventionally defined are included in nonretirement wealth. In particular, 
we consider the following six types of wealth.
1) Housing wealth, which we divide into two components: a) 
equity in the principal residence and b) equity in other real estate, 
including up to four (in 1983) or three (in 1989) additional properties, 
plus the amount owed to the household for land contracts (less the 
amount owed on land contracts). For each property, we compute 
equity as the difference between the current market value of the prop 
erty and the amount owed on that property (using up to two mort 
gages).
2) Business assets, or the net value of the household's share in up 
to two (in 1983) or three (in 1989) businesses in which someone in the 
household had an active management role, plus the net value of the 
household's share in businesses in which no one in the household had 
an active management role.
3) Life insurance, the value of which was calculated by taking the 
cash value of straight (or whole life) insurance and subtracting the 
amount of borrowing against the policy. (The face value of term insur 
ance was excluded because term insurance is not a financial asset, in 
that it cannot be borrowed against.)
4) Liquid assets, or the sum of the average balance in all checking 
accounts, all money market accounts, and all saving accounts, plus the 
dollar value of short-term certificates and certificates of deposit.
5) Stocks and bonds, or the sum of a) the market value of all 
stocks, call money accounts, and stock and other mutual funds held, b)
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the face value of U.S. savings bonds, government bonds and Treasury 
bills, state and municipal bonds, and corporate or foreign bonds held; 
and c) the value of trust accounts and managed investment accounts 
held.
6) Other assets, comprising cars (net of outstanding car loans) and 
tangible assets (such as gold, jewelry, and other objects).
Our results leave out debt that is not part of any of the other wealth 
category; that is, consumer loans, home improvement loans, credit card 
debt, and other lines of credit are not taken into account in any way.
Findings
Tables 3 and 4 report descriptive statistics and various measures of 
the inequality of wealth distribution from the 1983 and 1989 Surveys 
of Consumer Finance. It is useful to first examine the shares of the 
individual components of total wealth. The largest single component 
of wealth is housing (27 percent in 1983, 30 percent in 1989), followed 
by business assets (19 percent in both 1983 and 1989), private pension 
wealth (17 percent in 1983,14 percent in 1989), Social Security wealth 
(17 percent in 1983, 15 percent in 1989), and stocks and bonds (9 per 
cent in 1983, 8 percent in 1989). The other main forms of wealth—liq 
uid assets, life insurance, IRA/Keogh plans, and other assets—each 
account for 5 percent or less of total wealth. In aggregate, retirement 
wealth made up 35 percent of total wealth in 1983, 32 percent of total 
wealth in 1989, and was split roughly evenly between private pension 
wealth and Social Security wealth in both years.
The computed Gini coefficients suggest that all forms of assets are 
distributed highly unequally, except for Social Security wealth, which 
has Ginis of 0.334 in 1983 and 0.352 in 1989. Principal residence 
housing is next most equally distributed, with Ginis of 0.561 in 1983 
and 0.615 in 1989. Private pensions are the third most equally distrib 
uted form of wealth, with Ginis of 0.739 in 1983 and 0.765 in 1989. 
The distributions of business assets, stocks and bonds, and other real 
estate appear to be most unequal, with Gini coefficients of 0.90 or 
higher. Life insurance, liquid assets, and other assets have Ginis that 
are in the middle of the pack. Substantially the same inferences can be 
drawn from the share figures and the coefficients of variation.

















































































































































































SOURCE Authors' tabulations of 1983 SCF data on 1,722 households with a male aged 35 to 64 present. See text for variable definitions.
















































































































































































SOURCE. Authors' tabulations of 1983 SCF data on 1,722 households with a male aged 35 to 64 present. See text for vanable definitions
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Comparison of the Gini coefficients for overall retirement wealth 
(0.489 in 1983 and 0.500 in 1989) with the Ginis for overall nonretire- 
ment wealth (0.718 in 1983 and 0.753 in 1989) suggests that retirement 
wealth is considerably more evenly distributed than is nonretirement 
wealth. The relatively equal distribution of Social Security wealth is 
mainly responsible for this result. The Ginis for private pension wealth 
(0.739 in 1983 and 0.765 in 1989) are similar to those for nonretire 
ment wealth overall (0.713 in 1983 and 0.743 in 1989). Social Secu 
rity wealth (with Ginis of 0.334 in 1983 and 0.352 in 1989) clearly 
reduces inequality in the distribution of total retirement wealth. Again, 
the share figures and coefficients of variation are consistent with the 
Ginis.
However, the influence of private pension wealth on overall ine 
quality is not simple. Substantially less private pension wealth is con 
centrated in the top 5 and 10 percent of private pension holders than is 
the case for nonretirement wealth overall. Also, the coefficient of vari 
ation of private pension wealth is lower than that of nonretirement 
wealth overall. But, as already noted, the Gini coefficients of private 
pension wealth are slightly higher than those of nonretirement wealth 
overall. It follows that private pension wealth tends to even out the 
high end of the wealth distribution, but increases inequality below the 
20th percentile or so of the wealth distribution.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that, overall, the distribu 
tion of wealth grew more unequal between 1983 and 1989. With the 
exception of IRA/Keogh plans and stocks and bonds, the Gini coeffi 
cient of every category of wealth increased between 1983 and 1989. 
The Ginis of principal residence housing, liquid assets, and other assets 
increased especially sharply. The Ginis for both Social Security wealth 
and private pension wealth increased moderately during the 1980s, and 
the share figures suggest that much of the increased inequality of pri 
vate pension wealth occurred because of greater concentration of pen 
sion wealth at the very high end of the distribution (that is, above the 
10th percentile).
It is useful to compare the findings in Tables 3 and 4 with other 
empirical findings on the distribution of wealth. Kennickell and 
Sunden (1997), Weicher (1995, 1997), and Wolff (1994) used the 1983 
and 1989 SCF to examine nonretirement wealth and all found slight 
increases (comparable to that which we displayed in Tables 3 and 4) in
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the Gini coefficients of nonretirement wealth between 1983 and 1989. 
Kennickell and Sunden, Weicher, and Wolff all used more heteroge 
neous samples that we do—we restrict our sample to households with a 
male aged 35 to 64 present—and hence obtained higher Gini coeffi 
cients than we do. The changes in the Ginis from 1983 to 1989 are 
similar, however.
Other researchers have used the 1992 interview of the Retirement 
History Survey (RHS) to examine the impact of Social Security and 
private pensions on wealth inequality. Gustman et al. (1997) found 
that Social Security reduces overall wealth inequality, whereas private 
pensions increase overall wealth inequality. Gustman et al. found that 
pensions account for 23 percent and Social Security about 27 percent 
of total wealth—figures that are far higher than ours using the SCF. 
McGarry and Davenport (1997) concluded that private pensions have 
only slightly increased overall wealth inequality. Apart from the rela 
tively high proportion of wealth that is accounted for by Social Secu 
rity and private pensions (Gustman et al. 1997), the findings from the 
RHS studies are broadly similar to those from our work with the SCF.
To summarize our results, Tables 3 and 4 show that there are five 
major forms of wealth holding in the United States: housing (both prin 
cipal residence and other real estate, which account for 27-30 percent 
of all wealth), business assets (19 percent of all wealth), private pen 
sions (14-17 percent), Social Security (15-17 percent), and stocks and 
bonds (8-9 percent). The figures show clearly that business assets, 
stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the principal residence are 
the strongest contributors to overall wealth inequality (all have Gini 
coefficients of at least 0.9), whereas Social Security wealth is the main 
contributor to greater equality in the distribution of wealth (with a Gini 
of 0.33 to 0.35).
Principal residence housing plays an intermediate role in the distri 
bution of wealth. Principal residence housing has a Gini coefficient 
(around 0.6) that is close to that of the total wealth distribution (when 
Social Security wealth is included), although inspection of the wealth 
share figures suggests that the distribution of principal residence hous 
ing is equalizing at the high end of the total wealth distribution and dis- 
equalizing at the low end.
This leaves private pension wealth, which results essentially from 
employer contributions to pension plans. The Gini coefficients associ-
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ated with private pension wealth (around 0.75) suggest that private 
pensions do increase inequality in the total wealth distribution, when 
total wealth is defined to include the present value of future expected 
Social Security benefits. However, the Gini correlation of private pen 
sion wealth with total wealth is relatively low: only the Gini correla 
tions of life insurance and (in 1989) other assets with total wealth are 
lower. Also, as noted above, the distribution of private pension wealth 
tends to smooth out the high end of the wealth distribution. That is, 
although the Gini coefficients of private pension wealth are slightly 
higher than for nonretirement wealth overall, the coefficients of varia 
tion of private pension wealth and the shares of private pension wealth 
going to the top 5 and 10 percent of the distribution are lower than for 
nonretirement wealth overall. This finding suggests that private pen 
sions play an intermediate role in determining the distribution of 
wealth. Although they clearly fail to help equalize the overall distribu 
tion of wealth (as Social Security does), neither are private pensions a 
driving force behind increased wealth inequality, as are business assets, 
stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the principal residence.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have attempted to address a rather simple question: do 
employer contributions to health insurance and pensions increase or 
decrease inequalities in the distribution of compensation, income, and 
wealth? Most existing evidence—and intuition informed by the obser 
vation that highly paid workers tend to receive more generous nonwage 
benefits—suggests that employee benefits tend to increase inequality, 
but the answers we found are a bit more complicated.
First, we find that employer contributions to health insurance are 
far more unequally distributed than is personal income (most of which 
is earnings). Nevertheless, health insurance contributions are distrib 
uted in such a way that they slightly reduce inequality in the overall 
distribution of income (defined as the sum of personal income and 
employer contributions to health insurance). We would not make too 
much of this finding because the reduction of inequality accounted for 
by health insurance contributions is small. It is clear, however, that
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health insurance contributions made by employers, despite their highly 
unequal distribution, do not exacerbate inequalities of compensation 
and income. This is an unexpected result but one that is robust in both 
the 1977 NMCES and the 1987 NMES (see the third section above).
Second, we find that employer contributions to pension plans are a 
major form of wealth holding, about equal to Social Security wealth as 
a proportion of total wealth, and surpassed only by housing wealth and 
business assets. Stocks and bonds, the other major form of wealth 
holding, are less significant than private pensions or Social Security. 
Our main conclusion on the role of private pensions in the distribution 
of wealth can be summarized in two parts. First, private pensions are 
not one of the driving forces behind increased wealth inequality. 
Rather, business assets, stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the 
principal residence are the main contributors to wealth inequality. Sec 
ond, it is clear that, when total wealth is defined to include Social Secu 
rity wealth, private pensions do increase overall inequality in the total 
wealth distribution. However, the distribution of private pension 
wealth is quite different from that of overall nonretirement wealth. 
Private pension wealth clearly smooths the high end of the wealth dis 
tribution, increasing wealth inequality only below the 20th percentile 
of the wealth distribution. Private pensions, then, seem to play an 
intermediate role in determining the distribution of wealth. Although 
they do not help to equalize the overall distribution of wealth (as does 
Social Security), they are not one of the driving forces behind 
increased wealth inequality, and they reduce inequality at the high end 
of the wealth distribution.
What are the implications of these findings? Employer contribu 
tions to both health insurance and pension plans receive favorable 
treatment under existing tax law, and the continued favorable tax treat 
ment of each is a key part of the ongoing debate over fundamental tax 
reform (see, for example, Woodbury 1997 and the references cited 
there). The main finding from the medical expenditure surveys—that 
health insurance contributions have a slightly equalizing effect on the 
distribution of income—tends to argue for continued favorable tax 
treatment of employer-provided health insurance. It is not a strong 
argument because the equalizing effect of employer contributions to 
health insurance is not great. Moreover, the argument must be weighed
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against the various arguments for taxing employer contributions to 
health insurance, most of which are based on efficiency considerations. 
There were two main findings from the Surveys of Consumer 
Finances: Social Security is the great equalizer of wealth and private 
pensions are not a major force behind increasing wealth inequality. 
There are two implications. First, Social Security's central role in 
decreasing wealth inequality could well be an overriding reason to 
avoid full privatization of Social Security because full privatization 
would almost surely reduce the tendency of Social Security to equalize 
the wealth distribution. Second, in that private pensions are not a 
major force behind increasing wealth inequality, taxing employer con 
tributions to pension plans would be a less effective wealth equalizer 
than policies directed toward business assets, stocks and bonds, and 
real estate other than the principal residence. Also, any increases in 
wealth equality that might be achieved by taxing pension contributions 
would need to be weighed against the decline in savings that would 
likely result (Gale 1995).
Note
We are grateful to the William H. Donner Foundation and the WE. Upjohn Institute for 
support.
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